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Abstract
We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where
the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales
price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The
price leader clears the market by serving the residual demand. As price leaders, firms
with different marginal costs induce different prices. We compare two mechanisms
to determine the price leader, majority voting and competitive bidding. According
to the experimental data at least experienced price leaders with lower marginal costs
choose higher prices. In the bidding treatment, compensation payments to the price
leader crowd in efficiency concerns.
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Germany. e-mail: manfred.stadler@uni-tuebingen.de.
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1. Introduction
In many situations, groups elect one member as their leader, authorizing him
to make decisions affecting them all. Leadership is often associated with positive
attributes. But what is good for the group, may not be good for the leader and
vice versa. Furthermore, heterogeneous group members usually perform differently
as leaders. Whether the best candidate is selected when the leader is determined
endogenously, will be analyzed theoretically and experimentally.
To study the selection of a leader in a heterogeneous group, we rely on an
industrial organization model of endogenous price leadership. The literature on this
subject is vast. Using an endogenous timing game, van Damme and Hurkens (1999)
analyzed duopolistic quantity competition in the case of homogeneous products with
linear demand and constant unit cost, with one firm being more efficient than the
other. They show that risk dominance suggests that the more efficient firm will
take up the leadership position. Van Damme and Hurkens (2004) addressed the
same question in the context of price competition in a duopoly with substitutable
products, linear and symmetric demand, and constant unit cost. Again, the more
efficient firm emerges as the endogenous price leader. Taking capacity constraints
into account, Deneckere and Kovenock (1992), Furth and Kovenock (1993) and
Canoy (1996) show in a variety of circumstances that in a duopolistic setting both
firms prefer the more efficient firm to lead.
We deviate from this strand of literature in at least three ways. First, by relying
on the model of a dominant firm with competitive fringe, we extend the price-
leadership model along the lines suggested by Ono (1982) or Güth et al. (1989) and
allow for more than two firms in the market, but restrict ourselves to the case of
three firms in order to experimentally implement the model. Second, we account
for increasing unit cost. Third, since our focus is on the incentives for voluntary
cooperation via price leadership, we enrich the setup by two alternative mechanisms
to endogenously select the price leader, namely majority voting and competitive
bidding. By implementing the enriched model experimentally, we provide additional
empirical findings to the already available experimental evidence (see, e.g., Kübler
and Müller, 2002).
In our model, the price leader sets a price to which all other competitors, the
followers, adjust their sales amount optimally according to their individual supply
functions. To guarantee his price choice, the leader serves the residual demand.1
1Rather than justifying quantity setting by tatonnement adjustment or fictitious auctioneers
Obviously, followers are interested in a high price. The highest price occurs when
the lowest cost competitor acts as price leader. Asking a competitor to act as price
leader is justifiable since the price leader is not forced to choose a higher than
competitive price.2 Furthermore, followers could reward the price leader by smaller
than optimal quantities in case of higher than competitive prices. In line with the
price leadership literature the leader is assumed to credibly commit to his price.
More basically, leadership refers to a more or less hierarchical structure of in-
teraction. In modern market economies, entrepreneurs or chief executive officers
mostly play the role of a decisive leader. Other examples are technological leaders
or simply sellers who, as in our model, precommit before others. Whereas our model
assumes that leader and followers determine different action variables, namely the
uniform price respectively their sales quantities, most other leadership models rely
on the same type of choices by leaders and followers, e.g., on markets with quantity
competition or in public good experiments with “leading by example” (see Capellen
et al., 2013). In the latter type of experiments, unlike in our scenarios, the bench-
mark solution, which is based on common opportunism, fails to predict voluntary
cooperation via leadership.
We compare two mechanisms3 to award the leadership role in price setting, one
mechanism where no other reciprocation is possible than via sales reduction and
one allowing to monetarily reward the price leader: majority voting (the firm with
the most votes becomes price leader) and competitive bidding (sellers determine
monetary compensations for the price leader). Both mechanisms share the intuition
that a lower cost competitor is the more likely price leader, whereas compensation
payments in the bidding treatment are expected to crowd in efficiency concerns of
price leaders.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce
a triopoly model of price leadership. In Section 3, we endogenize price leadership
by a voting and a bidding scenario. Section 4 describes the experimental protocol.
The experimental findings are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
or, more ingeniously, by first-capacity-then-price-setting models (see Kreps and Sheinkman, 1983),
the model of price leadership justifies quantity competition by all but one seller (e.g., Güth et al.,
1989).
2Choosing the competitive price allows the leader to sell his optimal quantity at this price.
3With unbiased random assignment as default.
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2. The price leadership model
We focus on a homogeneous product market with three asymmetric seller firms
i = 1, 2, 3. Market demand is assumed to be linear
D(p) = max{0, α− βp} ; α, β > 0,
with D(p) denoting total demand at sales price p. We rely on firm-specific
quadratic cost functions
Ci(qi) = (ci + dqi)qi , 0 ≤ ci ≤ α/β , d > 0 ,
with qi denoting the quantity produced and sold by firm i = 1, 2, 3. Of course,
asymmetry of cost could also rely on different coefficients of the quadratic term, but
as in the experiment, this generalization is avoided here to limit complexity. Firms
i = 1, 2, 3 earn profits
πi = pqi − Ci(qi) .
For a given price, p > ci ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, each firm i would like to sell according to
its individual supply function
qi(p) = (p− ci)/(2d).



















such that all sales amounts are positive. From the perspec-
tive of methodological individualism, simply assuming that pc will result is rather
unsatisfactory. Price leadership does not only explain and justify market clearing
prices but also allows all firms to earn more than when selling at the competitive
price pc.
Price leadership requires one seller, the price leader ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, to set the
common sales price pℓ. This allows all other sellers j 6= ℓ to freely adjust their sales
quantities qj . This quantity-setting behavior of followers suggests
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Hypothesis 1. Followers choose optimal supply quantities given the leader’s price
choice.







By anticipating the optimal supply quantities qj(p) = (p−cj)/(2d) of all followers
j 6= ℓ, the residual demand for the price leader is
qℓ(p










by anticipating the quantity decisions of the followers can be derived as
pℓ =
(3 + 2βd)α+ (β + 3/(2d))
∑
j 6=ℓ cj + (β + 1/d)cℓ
2(β + 1/d)(2 + βd)
.
It can be shown that pℓ > pc for all ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i.e., any price leader will
set a price above the competitive one. Hence, all firms, i.e., the leader and the
followers, gain from price leadership. Further, the lower the price leader’s marginal
costs, the higher is the resulting equilibrium price. The reason for this somewhat
counter-intuitive effect is that higher marginal costs of rivals imply a higher residual
demand for the price leader.
This leads us to
Hypothesis 2a. Price leaders set prices optimally by anticipating the followers’
quantity reaction.
and
Hypothesis 2b. Price leaders with lower marginal costs set higher prices.
In our experiment, we use the parameter values α = 400, β = 1, c1 = 0, c2 =
100, c3 = 200, d = 1, implying the competitive price p
c = 220, the corresponding
sales amounts qc1 = 110, q
c
2 = 60, q
c
3 = 10, and profits π
c
1 = 12100, π
c
2 = 3600, π
c
3 =
100. In case of price leadership, the outcome depends on which competitor takes
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on the role of the leader. Table 1 summarizes the results for all three possible price
leaders, where πℓi denotes firm i ’s profit given that firm ℓ is price leader.
4











ℓ = 1 229 92.0 64.5 14.50 12604.00 4160.25 210.25
ℓ = 2 225 112.5 50.0 12.50 12656.25 3750.00 156.25
ℓ = 3 221 110.5 60.5 8.00 12210.25 3660.25 104.00
Table 1: Numerical results for all possible price leaders ℓ = 1, 2, 3
The comparison of a firm’s profit as price leader with the alternative profits this
firm realizes when another firm is in the leadership role illustrates the disincentive
to become price leader. Table 2 depicts column-wise the cases ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3} and






















Table 2: Gains or losses if another firm becomes price leader
Consider, for example, firm 1 as the price leader (first column). It would gain
πℓ=21 − π
ℓ=1
1 = 52.25 if firm 2 was price leader instead, while it would be worse off
if firm 3 became price leader, πℓ=31 − π
ℓ=1
1 = −393.75.
Regarding the endogenous determination of the price leader, these profit dif-
ferences can be regarded as compensations rendering a firm indifferent between
becoming leader or follower. Therefore Table 2 reflects the incentives as to which
firm to establish as price leader: while firms 1 and 2 prefer own leadership over
seller 3 being leader, firm 1’s disincentive to become price leader rather than firm 2
is only marginal, compared to what firms 2 and 3 gain by firm 1’s price leadership.
This gives us
Hypothesis 3. The two firms with higher marginal costs establish their lowest cost
4For the experimental implementation we rounded prices to the next integer and used these
integer numbers to calculate all other values. The precise values are pℓ=1 = 229.167, pℓ=2 =
225.000 and pℓ=3 = 220.833.
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competitor as price leader.
3. Endogenizing price leadership
How can firms establish such a price leadership from which all firms gain? If
cℓ < cℓ ′ for ℓ, ℓ
′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} with ℓ 6= ℓ′, then it holds that pℓ > pℓ
′
. Thus the usual
intuition that a lower (marginal) cost induces a lower price does not extend to our
price-leadership model. Due to the theoretical result, we nevertheless expect the
lowest cost seller to become price leader more often than his two competitors. It is,
however, less obvious how competing sellers can coordinate and agree on establishing
one of them as price leader. Since this is a burden, one wonders not only about the
mechanism for determining a price leader but also how such a price leader may be
compensated for accepting this burden. Regarding the mechanism, we are not aware
of any empirical evidence on how leadership is (tacitly) implicated in asymmetric
markets. The usual intuition is that the seller with a dominant market share serves
as leader, mostly but not always coinciding with our theoretical result that the seller
with the lowest cost should be selected for price leadership. In view of a lack of
guidance in terms of empirical facts, we do not focus on just one mechanism but
compare two such mechanisms differing in how the price leader can be rewarded for
accepting the burden of price leadership: one where followers can compensate the
price leader only by selling less than optimal quantities and one where followers can
also directly compensate the price leader monetarily what might enhance efficiency
concerns. In the following, we assume either of the two mechanisms as exogenously
given and accepted by all sellers. The first mechanism we analyze is the
Voting Treatment V: All three firms i ∈ {1, 2, 3} suggest a price leader ℓ ∈
{1, 2, 3}, and the firm with a majority of votes becomes price leader. In case of no
majority, the price leader is randomly selected with equal probabilities among all
candidates with the highest number of votes.
Specifically, it is an equilibrium outcome that at least the two high cost sellers
vote for the competitor with the lowest cost. If, for instance, the two high cost sellers
vote for the low cost seller and the lowest cost seller votes for himself, no firm would
gain by unilaterally deviating. As is typical for majority voting, other equilibria
exist:5 whenever all three sellers unanimously vote for the same candidate ℓ, no
individual seller i can gain by deviating from unanimity. For strict majorities (only
5See Güth et al. (1985) for applying the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) theory of equilibrium
selection to resolve strategic uncertainty in such voting games.
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two voters agree) the deviating seller should not induce a majority voter to join him.
There exists an abundance of (pure and mixed) strategy equilibria featuring different
sellers as price leaders. However, among all these equilibria, establishing the low
cost type as price leader is clearly focal and obviously justifiable by equilibrium
selection.
We compare this voting treatment with the
Bidding Treatment B: All firms i ∈ {1, 2, 3} place a bid bi ∈ R
+, stating
how much they would suffer from being price leader, i = ℓ. The seller placing the
lowest bid becomes price leader with unbiased random selection among those with
minimal bids. More formally, each seller i = 1, 2, 3 chooses a bid bi ∈ R
+, and the
price leader ℓ satisfies bℓ ≤ bj , j 6= ℓ. The two other sellers j 6= ℓ compensate the
price leader by paying him the nonnegative difference between their own bid and







from his rivals. The profit functions including these transfer payments for the
followers are




ℓ for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j 6= ℓ,







For an illustration of the bidding mechanism consider the differences in profits
between being leader or follower in Table 2. Given our numerical example and our
experimental setting, where bids can be varied only in discrete steps ǫ = 1, the only
pure strategy equilibrium is that firm 1 bids zero and firms 2 and 3 bid marginally
above zero, i.e. b1 = 0, b2 = b3 = ǫ = 1. Firm 1 will not increase its bid as this
would involve the risk of firm 3 becoming price leader. Firms 2 and 3 have no
incentive to deviate because they prefer firm 1 as price leader.
The profit differences in Table 2 reflect how much a firm is maximally willing
to pay for not having to take on the burden of price leadership. We expect these
differences to be relevant in the experiment, even if bidding strategies relying on
profit differences do not constitute an equilibrium. We will elaborate on this point
in more detail when discussing the experimental results below.
One may object that both mechanisms, voting and bidding, do not require the
consent of the chosen price leader ℓ, i.e., they do not grant veto power. However,
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the price leader is not forced to set a price pℓ higher than the competitive price pc.
Specifically, by setting pℓ = pc each seller could guarantee that he sells his most
preferred amount at price pc. In this sense, neither mechanism violates voluntariness
since price leaders can always induce the competitive price.
From a behavioral perspective, participants in our experiment will usually be
either incapable or unwilling to engage in backward induction analysis, especially
when the different stages feature different tasks of independent choice making as in
our setup (see, e.g., Binmore et al., 1985, and Johnson et al., 2002). One could have
avoided backward induction by robot decision making in one or two of the three
stages, for example, by implementing rational decision making in those stages. We
are, however, interested in the behavior in all stages, namely in
• who is determined as price leader in the voting or bidding stage, respectively
(Hypothesis 3),
• whether the optimal price is chosen in the price setting stage
(Hypothesis 2a),
• whether price leaders with lower marginal costs set higher prices
(Hypothesis 2b) and
• whether followers choose optimal sales amounts
(Hypothesis 1).
Altogether, we expect to confirm, at best, qualitative effects of the benchmark solu-
tion such as establishing the lowest cost seller as price leader more often. As usual,
the benchmark also provides a nice way to experimentally describe the observed
behavior via the direction and extent of how it deviates from the benchmark.
4. Experimental design and setup
We implemented both mechanisms, voting and bidding, as between-subjects
treatments and included a control treatment where price leadership was established
randomly. The experimental instructions differ only in the paragraph on how to
determine the price leader (see the instructions in Appendix A). To allow for learn-
ing, the game is played 10 times using a random strangers matching protocol. More
specifically, in each session 27 participants took part, divided into three matching
groups of 9 participants each. Since we assigned constant roles (participants were
assigned constant marginal costs, called “z-values” 0, 100, and 200, respectively),
a matching group consisted of three participants for each of the three z-values.
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Participants were not informed about the restricted rematching within matching
groups to weaken possible repeated game effects. Throughout the experiment, pay-
offs were calculated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which were converted
into euros at a given exchange rate (500 ECU = 1 euro) at the end of the exper-
iment. Participants were informed about the exchange rate in the experimental
instructions.
Each of the 10 rounds consisted of three successive stages: In the first stage, price
leadership was established (participants chose one participant to take on “role X”).
In the voting treatment, participants simply indicated which z-value participant
they wanted to take on role X , i.e. price leadership. In the bidding treatment,
we imposed b ∈ [0, B] with B = 2, 000 to reduce the multiplicity of equilibrium
bid vectors b = (b1, b2, b3). Immediately after bidding or voting, participants were
informed which z-seller was established in role X . Additionally, in the bidding
treatment, the compensations that the participant in role X received from the other
two participants were displayed. In the second stage, the price leader set the price
(“x-value”) within range p ℓ ∈ [210, 240]. The software allowed the price leader to
calculate the payoffs for hypothetical quantity choices by the other participants. In
the third stage, the followers (“role Y”) chose their sales quantity (“y-value”) within
range q ∈ [0, 115]. Followers could also compute their payoffs before submitting
their definitive decision to help them cope with the nonlinear profit functions.
All sessions started with a set of control questions concerning (i) the different
decision tasks in the three stages of the experiment and (ii) how to calculate payoffs.
The experiment started when all participants had answered all control questions
correctly. After completion of the 10 rounds, participants were asked to fill out a
post experimental questionnaire designed to collect demographic information and
assess their risk tolerance and decisiveness (see Holt and Laury, 2002).6
Besides a show-up fee of 2.50 euros, participants received the payoff earned in
one randomly chosen round of the experiment as well as the reward for the lottery
question in the post experimental questionnaire. The experiment was programmed
in z-tree (see Fischbacher, 2007). We ran 9 sessions (3 for each treatment) with 27
participants each, i.e., 9 independent matching groups for each treatment. On aver-
age, one session lasted about 110 minutes, and the average payment of participants
amounted to 15.28 euros.
6Since the model is deterministic, these questions serve to identify personality traits and should
not be interpreted as assessing risk attitude in the sense of expected utility theory.
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5. Experimental results
5.1. Determination of the price leader
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the two sellers with higher marginal costs try to
establish their low cost competitor as price leader.
In the voting treatment, the low cost competitor (c = 0) is established as price
leader in 38.2% of cases (see Table 3). In 32.2% of cases price leaders were of the
high cost type (c = 200) and in 29.6% of cases price leaders were of the medium
cost type (c = 100). Considering only the last three rounds, the low cost type is
established as price leader substantially more often (49.4%), while the medium and
the high cost type each receive just about half as many votes.




Table 3: Relative frequencies of cost types in the role of the price leader in the voting treatment,
(in brackets: last three rounds)
Table 4 illustrates the voting behavior of the different cost types, i.e., who voted
for whom. Interestingly, the main diagonal has the lowest frequency row- and
column-wise, i.e., participants seem to understand that becoming price leader is a














low cost type medium cost type high cost type
low cost type 24.4% (27.2%) 43.3% (45.7%) 32.2% (27.2%)
medium cost type 45.2% (48.1%) 14.8% (12.3%) 40.0% (39.5%)
high cost type 49.3% (61.7%) 35.6% (37.0%) 15.2% (1.2%)
Table 4: Relative frequencies of votes given the different cost types in the voting treatment (in
brackets: last three rounds)
Instead, we find both high cost type competitors to vote mostly for the low cost
type as price leader: 45.2% of participants with medium marginal costs and 49.3%
of participants with high marginal costs voted for the low cost type as price leader,
thereby supporting Hypothesis 3.
Result 1a. In the voting treatment, sellers with higher marginal costs try to estab-
lish their low cost competitor as price leader.
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Surprisingly, in the bidding treatment the high cost type is established as price
leader in the majority of cases (47.4%), while only 16.7% of the low cost type
participants are elected as price leaders. If we account for learning effects, this
result remains nearly unchanged (see the percentages in brackets in Table 5).




Table 5: Relative frequencies of cost types in the role of the price leader in the bidding treatment
(in brackets: last three rounds)
Comparing the average bids placed by the respective cost types (see Table 6),
we find the mean bid of 178.6 of the high cost participants to be far (slightly) below
the mean bid of 539.5 (189.6) of the low (medium) cost type participants.
cost type obs. min. bid max. bid mean std. dev.
low 270 (81) 0 (0) 2000 (1988) 539.5 (378.9) 574.8 (434.4)
medium 270 (81) 0 (0) 1999 (520) 189.6 (104.8) 323.6 (128.9)
high 270 (81) 0 (0) 2000 (2000) 178.6 (121.5) 382.8 (322.3)
Table 6: Descriptive statistics concerning bids (in brackets: last three rounds)
Thus participants’ bidding behavior deviates from equilibrium. Possibly partic-
ipants’ strategies are associated with the maximal willingness to pay to avoid the
burden of price leadership. According to Table 2, the maximal willingness to pay
for the medium cost type is given by his payoff increase of 410.25 when the low cost
type becomes price leader instead of himself. Hence, the willingness of the medium
cost type to compensate the low cost type for taking over price leadership should
not exceed 410.25. Given that participants associate their bidding strategies with
the values given in Table 2, the relative ordering of bids should follow the pattern:
bids(medium cost type) > bids(high cost type) > bids(low cost type).
While absolute bids are not in line with what Table 2 suggests, regarding the
relative ordering of bids, we find partial support for the predicted pattern: a com-
parison of the bidding behavior of the different cost types reveals that the bids of
the low cost types exceed those of the medium cost types (p -value < 0.01, Mann-
Whitney ranksum test), the bids of the medium cost types exceed those of the high
cost types (p -value < 0.05), and the bids of the low cost types exceed those of the
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high cost types (p -value < 0.01). Thus we find the pattern:
bids(low cost type) > bids(medium cost type) > bids(high cost type).
Hence, the low cost types bid significantly more than the higher cost types. A
consequence of the significantly higher bids of low cost types is that higher cost
types are not able to establish the 0-cost seller as price leader.
Two patterns of participants’ bidding behavior suggest that their strategies nev-
ertheless approach the benchmark strategies, at least as they become more expe-
rienced. First, the absolute bids of all cost types significantly decrease over the
ten rounds of the experiment (linear regression of round number on absolute bids,
p-value< 0.05), and second, compensation payments significantly decrease over the
rounds of the experiment (linear regression of round number on compensation pay-
ments, p-value< 0.01). Decreasing compensation payments reflect that the differ-
ence between leader and follower bids decreases, suggesting that participants learn
to bid only slightly more than the price leader, as proposed by the benchmark so-
lution. As we find that compensation payments are significantly lower for price
leaders of the low cost type (Mann-Whitney ranksum tests, p -value < 0.01), this
effect seems to be stronger for constellations where the low cost type is established
as price leader.
These considerations are summarized in
Result 1b. In the bidding treatment, firms with higher marginal costs are not able
to establish their low cost competitor as price leader. With experience, bidding
strategies approach the theoretical benchmark.
While, from a behavioral perspective, the bidding treatment might have cognitively
overburdened participants, experience seemingly helps them to better understand
the strategic aspects of the game.
5.2. Price choices
Hypothesis 2a claims that price leaders set optimal prices. To admit noise in
setting optimal prices, we rely on the notion of ǫ-equilibria (see Radner, 1980) and
allow a 3% variation in payoff space around the optimum. For the three possible
scenarios (low, medium, or high cost type is price leader), this variation has to
be calculated separately. In case of the medium cost type being price leader, the
optimal price choice (pℓ = 225) would lead to a profit of 3,750 for the price leader,
and a 3% tolerance of deviations from optimality would render the range of profits
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between 3,637.5 and 3,750 as nearly optimal. This range is reached for price choices
between 220.7 and 229.3, which we therefore consider as (nearly) optimal price











































Figure 1: Percentage of price leaders with nearly optimal price choice (with 3% tolerance for
deviations from optimality)
Figure 1 displays the percentage of leaders with a nearly optimal price choice
given their cost type. The difference between the treatments is greatest for the low
cost type: taking learning effects into account by considering only the last three
rounds, 84.6% of all leaders of this cost type make nearly optimal price decisions
in the bidding treatment as opposed to 45% in the voting treatment. Even without
learning effects, the propensity to choose an optimal price for the low cost type is
higher in the bidding than in the voting treatment. These findings partly support
Hypothesis 2a.
Result 2a. For low cost price leaders optimal price choices pℓ are more frequent in
the bidding than in the voting treatment. For experienced participants the same is
true also for high cost price leaders.
The price setting of low cost price leaders could be driven by fairness concerns:
as they receive compensation payments from the other participants they may have a
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strong incentive to behave efficiently. The low cost price leader may also be inspired
by reciprocity, for example, when expecting the same behavior from other partici-
pants in future rounds. Overall, the theoretical benchmark for optimal prices cannot
fully explain the experimental results. Nevertheless, the qualitative prediction of
Hypothesis 2b is confirmed.
The mean price choices of leaders, given their respective cost type, support Hy-
pothesis 2b stating that lower marginal costs lead to higher prices: pooling the
data from all three treatments for low cost price leaders, the mean price is 227.4,
while price choices of medium cost leaders are on average 225.9, and mean prices of
high cost leaders amount to 222.9. Statistical tests of the differences between price
choices of low and high cost leaders and medium and high cost leaders, respec-
tively, reveal that these differences are strongly significant (p -value < 0.001, Mann-
Whitney ranksum test). Only the price choices of leaders with low and medium
costs are not significantly different (p -value > 0.05).7 Comparing the price choices
of experienced players (last three rounds) for the three different types of price lead-
ers, we find all differences to be statistically significantly different from each other
(p -value < 0.01). This leads to
Result 2b. Experienced price leaders with lower marginal costs set higher prices.
5.3. Quantity choices
According to Hypothesis 1, followers choose optimal supply quantities given
the leader’s price choice. As before, to admit noise in choosing optimal quantities
we allow for a 3% variation in payoff space around the optimum. For the three
possible scenarios (low, medium, or high cost type is price leader), this variation
has to be calculated separately. In every scenario both followers set their quantities
separately, and we assume that only one of the followers possibly deviates from the
optimal quantity choice. As an example take the scenario where the low cost type
is price leader. The medium cost follower’s optimum quantity choice (64.5) yields
a profit of 4, 160.25 for him. A 3% tolerance of deviations from optimality yields a
quantity range between 53 and 75 as being nearly optimal.
7We consider all price choices to be independent in spite of possibly many price choices of the













































Figure 2: Percentage of followers with nearly optimal quantity choice in the last 3 rounds (with
3% tolerance for deviations from optimality)
Figure 2 displays the percentage of followers with nearly optimal quantity choices
given their cost type and the cost type of the respective leader in the last three
rounds. The far left columns, for example, depict the percentage of (nearly) optimal
quantity choices of the medium and high cost followers in the scenario where the
low cost type is price leader. In this case, 45% of the high cost followers set (nearly)
optimal quantities, whereas 92.5% of the medium cost followers’ choices are (nearly)
optimal. Even without learning effects, we find that in both treatments over 90%
of the low and medium cost followers choose (nearly) optimal quantities. This gives
us
Result 3. In the bidding and the voting treatment, more than 90% of low and
medium cost type followers choose (nearly) optimal quantities.
For the high cost followers the percentages of (nearly) optimal quantity choices
are low: in the scenario with the low cost type as price leader 45% set their quantities
optimally in the voting treatment as opposed to 76.9% in the bidding treatment.
In the scenario with the medium cost type as price leader, 59.1% choose nearly
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optimally in the voting and 43.3% in the bidding treatment. The histograms in
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Figure 4: Quantity choices of high cost followers if the medium cost type is price leader
Possible explanations for the relatively strong deviation of the high cost followers
from optimality may be that loss aversion may induce them to reduce quantities and
thus their expenses. They may also want to compensate the price leader. While
in the bidding treatment followers can additionally compensate the price leader,
fairness attempts in the voting treatment require to sell below the optimum quan-
tity. In both treatments, the cost type of the price leader is decisive for downward
deviations from optimality. Given a low cost leader in the bidding treatment, 57.8%
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(53.8%) of the high cost followers set quantities below the optimum, as compared
to 29.1% (20%) in the voting treatment (numbers in parentheses are values in the
last 3 rounds). The higher percentage of downward deviations in the bidding treat-
ment could be due to an attempt to recover one’s compensation payments. With
a medium cost leader, the relation is reversed and lower than optimal quantities
are more frequent in the voting treatment: 52.5% (63.6%) of high cost followers
set lower than optimal quantities, as compared to 36.1% (33.3%) in the bidding
treatment. This could be due to followers setting lower than optimal quantities in
order to compensate the price leader.
The histograms also reveal that participants choices peak at the values 5 (voting:
18.7%, bidding: 14.6%), 15 (voting: 17.3%, bidding: 8.8%), and 20 (voting: 30.7%,
bidding: 20.3%). This hints at the fact that participants were allowed to calculate
payoffs before submitting a definite decision: participants successively tried out
values in steps of 5 units and stopped when the supplied payoff seemed high enough.
6. Concluding remarks
Price leadership on oligopolistic product markets is an appealing approach to
explain and justify market clearing prices in the tradition of methodological individ-
ualism according to which social phenomena are based on individual choice making.
It also allows for moderate cooperation enabling firms to earn higher profits than
when selling at the competitive price. By inducing a moderate price increase, price
leadership may not arouse the suspicion of antitrust authorities. Even if detected, it
would most certainly not be considered illegal. What should prevent one competi-
tor from setting a price to which all other competitors adjust with the price leader
serving the residual demand? To the best of our knowledge, such behavior is not
illegal, and even if so, it could hardly be verified by antitrust authorities.
We have analyzed price leadership on a homogeneous market with three asym-
metric competitors determining endogenously who takes on the role of the price
leader. The distinction between the alternative mechanisms bidding and voting was
implemented experimentally by carrying out two separate treatments. The main
experimental result regarding the establishment of a price leader is that in the vot-
ing but not in the bidding treatment, firms with higher marginal costs try, and
mostly succeed, to establish the lowest cost competitor as price leader. Regarding
the price setting behavior, we found that optimal price choices of low and high cost
sellers are more frequent in the bidding treatment. Thus, as expected, monetary
compensation of the price leader crowds in efficiency concerns. Further we found
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that experienced price leaders with lower marginal costs choose higher prices in both
treatments. Finally, considering the decisions of followers, our analysis revealed that
optimal quantity choices in both treatments are close to the theoretically predicted
outcome for low and medium cost followers.
Thus, although experimental outcomes partly differ from the theoretically pre-
dicted ones, the main qualitative predictions are confirmed. Most importantly, we
find that lower marginal costs of price leaders indeed result in higher market prices
when participants are more experienced and have learned to behave more adequately
in the rather demanding experimental scenarios.
Which qualitative effects are confirmed or not depends partly on conditions such
as (in)experience (see Results 2a and 2b) or the mechanism for establishing the price
leader (compare Results 1a and 1b). These conditions also affect - game theoret-
ically - unpredicted path dependence (see Result 2a).8 Regarding the mechanism
to establish the price leader, we provide, at best, some guidance as to which of the
two mechanisms is better. In the field, what matters most is probably to prevent
observability and verifiability by antitrust authorities. In our setup, this seems to
suggest the voting rather than the bidding mechanism due to the monetary transfers
of the latter.
In the real world, we cannot expect that firms will actually agree on a voting
or bidding mechanism, meaning that both mechanisms are only proxies for some
unknown procedures. It may be that price leadership is rather spontaneous or the
result of a negotiation, whose likely outcomes are captured by the proposed voting
or bidding mechanism.
8In industrial organization, one is more interested in the more adequate behavior of experienced





Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive 2.50 euros for
showing up on time. Please remain silent and turn off your mobile phones. The
instructions are identical for each participant. Please read them carefully. You are
not allowed to talk to other participants during the experiment. In case you do
not follow these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment as well as
from any payment. The 2.50 euros show-up fee and any other amount of money
you will earn during the experiment will be paid out to you in cash at the end of
the experiment. All participants will be paid individually, i.e. no other participant
will know the amount of your payment. All monetary amounts in the experiment
are calculated in ECU (experimental currency units). At the end, all earned ECUs
will be converted into euros using the following exchange rate: 500 ECU = 1 euro.
Experimental Procedure
The experiment consists of four control questions followed by ten experimental
rounds and a final questionnaire. In each round you will interact with two other
participants who will be randomly assigned each round anew. You will not be
informed about the identity of these participants. It is unlikely that the same group
constellation will occur twice. The interacting participants differ in a randomly
assigned trait z. z can have one of three values: z = 0, z = 100 or z = 200. At the
beginning of the experiment, you and the other participants in your group will be
randomly assigned a trait z which you will keep throughout the whole experiment.
In each round, three participants with the three possible traits will be randomly
grouped together in such a way that each group consists of one participant with z
-value 0, one participant with z-value 100 and one with z-value 200.
After each round, you will be shown the round’s results. One of the rounds will
be selected as relevant for the final payment which will be determined according to
the rules displayed in the instructions. In case you receive a negative result in the
selected round, the amount will be subtracted from your total payment. Regardless
of the selected round, you will receive the amount of 2.50 euros for showing up on
time. Thus your final payment cannot be negative. In addition, one of the questions
from the questionnaire will be chosen as relevant to your final payment. Hence, your
final payment is composed of the following parts:
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Show-up fee (2.50 euros)
+ Earnings from a randomly selected round
+ Earnings from a randomly selected question from the questionnaire
Detailed Description of the Experiment
From now on, we will refer to the three different participants with their different
values of z as z-value-0 participant, z-value-100 participant, and z-value-200 par-
ticipant. The decisions taken by the participants will carry the z-value of their
decision makers as an index. That way, every decision can be clearly associated
to one z-value participant. As an example, x0 is the value defined by the z-value
0 participant. The following three decision stages will be repeated ten times alto-
gether, where the participants’ assigned trait values z = 0, z = 100, and z = 200
stay the same throughout the whole experiment. Each round consists of three stages.
[next paragraph only in the voting treatment]
First Stage - Assignment of Role X
In the first stage, you will vote which one of the three z-value participants will take
on role X. In the second stage, the participant in role X will decide on the value
of xz , which will have an impact on the payment of all participants in the group.
During this round, the other two participants will take on role Y. In this voting
procedure, all three z-value participants will cast their votes. In the event of a tie,
it is randomly decided by the computer who will have role X. When voting about
the assignment of role X, you can also vote for yourself. After all participants have
voted, you will be informed about the voting results.
[next paragraph only in the bidding treatment]
First Stage - Assignment of Role X
In the first stage, it will be decided by placing of bids which one of the three z-value
participants will take on role X. In the second stage, the participant in role X will
decide on the value of xz , which will have an impact on the payment of all partici-
pants in the group. During this round, the other two participants will take on role
Y. All z-value participants will simultaneously place a bid gz between 0 and 2000
(including the two numbers). The participant with the lowest bid will be assigned
role X. The other two participants will take on role Y. We will refer to the minimal
bid placed by the z-value participants with role X as gminz . The z-value participant
in role X will receive a payment Pz from both participants in role Y, amounting to
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the difference of their own bid and the bid placed by the z-value participant with
role X, Pz = gz − g
min
z . gz is the bid of the participant in role Y, g
min
z is the min-
imal bid of the participant in role X. In case of several identical minimal bids, the
computer will randomly decide which one will take on role X. After all participants
have placed their bid you will be informed about the assignment of role X.
[next paragraph only in the control treatment]
First Stage - Assignment of Role X
In the first stage, role X will be randomly assigned to one of the three z-value par-
ticipants. In the second stage, the participant in role X will decide on the value
of xz , which will have an impact on the payment of all participants in the group.
During this round, the other two participants will take on role Y.
[all treatments]
Second Stage - Defining the Value of xz
The participant in role X will define the value of xz , choosing any integer between
210 and 240 (including the two numbers). The two participants in role Y will be
informed about the decision taken by the participant in role X.
Third Stage - Defining the Value of yz
After being informed about the previously taken decision of value xz, the two par-
ticipants in role Y will independently define their value of yz by choosing any integer
between 0 and 115 (including the two numbers). This is the end of the interaction
between participants in that round.
Information at the End of a Round
At the end of each round, you will receive the following information:
[only voting treatment]
The result of the vote on role X; i.e., which z-value participant will be assigned role
X,
[only bidding treatment]
The result of the bid, i.e., which z-value participant will be assigned role X,
[only control treatment]
The result of the random assignment of role X to one of the z-value participants,
[all treatments]
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The decision on the value of xz by the participant in role X,
The decision on the value of yz by both participants in role Y, and
The payment of all three z-value participants.
Payments
The payments depend on your role (X or Y), your z-value, the decision on the
value of xz by the z-value participant in role X, and the decisions on yz by the two
participants in role Y. In the following, we will refer to the z-values of the partic-
ipants as za, zb, and zc. Each of the variables can take on the values 0, 100, or
200. In case the participant in role X has got the z-value za and the participants
in role Y have got the z-values zb and zc, the payments can be calculated as follows:
The participant in role Y with the z-value zb and the choice yzb earns:
(xza − zb− yzb) · yzb
The participant in role Y with the z-value zc the choice yzc earns:
(xza − zc− yzc) · yzc
The participant in role X with the z-value za and the choice xza earns:
(xza − za−R) ·R
R is determined as follows: R = 400− xza − yzb − yzc
[next paragraph only in the bidding treatment]
In addition, the participant in role X receives a payment from each of the partici-




z being the minimal bid by the
participant in role X.
This means the amount Pzb = gzb − g
min
za will be subtracted from the payment
of the participant in role Y with the z-value zb. The participant in role Y with the
z-value zc will have the amount Pzc = gzc−g
min
za subtracted from his payment. The





The z-value 100 participant in role X selects x100 = 223. The z-value 200 participant
in role Y selects y200 = 15. His payment is determined by (223−200−15)·15 = 120.
The other participant in role Y has z-value 0 and selects y0 = 100. His payment
results from (223 − 0 − 100) · 100 = 12, 300. To determine the payment of z-value
100 participant, R has to be calculated first; R = 400− 223− 15− 100 = 62. As a
result, the z-value 100 participant’s payment is (223− 100− 62) · 62 = 3, 782.
[only bidding treatment]
Assuming the z-value participants’ bids in the first round are z-value 0: g0 = 1, 800
z-value 100: g100 = 150
z-value 200: g200 = 200
the z-value 100 participant would be assigned role X. In addition to the amount
above, he receives payments from the participants in role Y amounting to (1, 800−
150) + (200 − 150) = 1, 700. However, the two z-value participants in role Y each
have to subtract a certain amount from their initial payment. The z-value 0 par-
ticipant pays 1, 800 − 150 = 1, 650 to the participant in role X. The z-value 200
participant pays 200− 150 = 50 to the participant in role X.
The resulting total payments are
z-value 0: (223− 0− 100)100− 1, 650 = 10, 650
z-value 100: (223− 100− 62) · 62 + 1, 700 = 5, 482
z-value 200: (223− 200− 15) · 15− 50 = 70
[all treatments]
Before the start of the experiment, we ask you to answer some control questions
which are designed to improve your understanding of the rules of the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
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Appendix B
Residual demand is sometimes negative due to suboptimal behavior of the price
leader (setting too high a price) or the followers (choosing too large sales quanti-
ties).9 Actually, in 132 out of the 140 cases with negative residual demand, this







Figure 5: Frequency of negative residual demand
In Figure 5, we depict the frequencies of a negative residual demand for the re-
spective cost types of price leaders across the 10 rounds of the experiment (the solid
line representing the highest cost type, the dotted line the medium cost type, and
the dashed line the lowest cost type). Thus this phenomenon mainly occurs when
the highest cost type is chosen as price leader and could be explained by frustration
of these high cost participants. Figure 5 additionally reveals that the frequency
tends to decrease over time, meaning that learning takes place. When comparing
treatments, the number of matching group outcomes with a negative residual de-
mand is higher in the bidding treatment, confirming that this mechanism is less
easily understood by our participants.
9In the instructions it was explained that this implies a loss for the price leader who has to buy
the excess supply at his chosen price pℓ.
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